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OF LAW AND LEGACIES 
Eric Berger 
ABSTRACT 
This contribution to the symposium on President Obama’s 
constitutional legacy examines the relationship between constitutional law and 
presidential legacies.  Americans respect or even revere many presidents 
despite their apparent constitutional violations.  Some unconstitutional 
actions, though, appear more forgivable than others.  The effect constitutional 
transgressions may have on a president’s more general legacy turns on a 
variety of contextual factors, including, among others, the president’s values 
and vision, the administration’s political successes and failures, political 
opponents’ principles and behavior, the challenges confronting the country, 
and the nature of the constitutional norms at issue.  Constitutional law, as 
articulated by lawyers and judges, is not irrelevant to presidential legacies, but 
it rarely defines them.    
While some of President Obama’s unilateral executive actions raised 
serious constitutional questions, it is unlikely his legacy will turn on those 
measures’ legality.  In most cases, President Obama followed past presidential 
practices and offered colorable (though admittedly contestable) legal defenses.  
Moreover, context helps explain, if not completely justify, many of Obama’s 
controversial actions.  To this extent, historians and members of the general 
public are likely to view the Obama presidency through a broader, nonlegal 
lens, considering, inter alia, the challenges he inherited, the policies he helped 
implement, and, especially, the vitriolic opposition he faced in Congress.   
Indeed, the lead constitutional story from the Obama years will likely 
highlight not particular executive actions but rather our constitutional system’s 
deficiencies more generally.  U.S. politics became increasingly dysfunctional 
during Obama’s presidency, and they have not improved since.  Dysfunctional 
politics, of course, ought not immunize executive actions from legal attack.  
 
   Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty, University of Nebraska 
College of Law. Thanks to Anne Duncan, Jeff Duncan, Matt Schaefer, Miguel Schor, 
Steve Willborn, and the participants in the 2017 Drake Constitutional Law Symposium, 
the University of Nebraska College of Law Workshop Series, and the University of 
Wisconsin Discussion Group on Constitutionalism for very helpful thoughts in 
conversation and on early drafts. I am also grateful to Professor Mark Kende and the 
editors of the Drake Law Review for organizing the symposium on President Obama’s 
Constitutional Legacy. Finally, I thank Dillon Malone and his fellow editors for 
meticulous editorial assistance and Sarah Burghaus for very capable research assistance.  
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However, the depth of this dysfunction should encourage lawyers to broaden 
their focus beyond narrow questions of legality in individual cases to more 
fundamental concerns about the health of our constitutional democracy.   
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“‘Tis easy to forgive those you like.” — Irish proverb 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In assessing the constitutional legacy of President Barack Obama, or 
any president, we should clarify the nature of the inquiry. I therefore begin 
with a question: Might there sometimes be a meaningful distinction between 
a legalist inquiry and a historical one? In other words, might the court of 
history sometimes assess a president’s legacy differently than a court of law 
would? 
The legalist inquiry asks whether judges and lawyers would find that 
president’s actions constitutional under current doctrine. The historical 
inquiry is necessarily broader and more multifaceted. It is less concerned 
with legal technicalities and considers presidential actions in light of a variety 
of contextual factors. 
To borrow from Isaiah Berlin, under this framework, the legalist is a 
hedgehog, focusing single-mindedly on the legality of the president’s 
actions.1 The historian is a fox, approaching presidents from a variety of 
perspectives.2 To be sure, these conceptions of the lawyer and historian are 
artificial and oversimplified,3 but the dichotomy helps highlight the extent to 
which lawyers focus on different questions than others. Both the legalist and 
historical inquiries are valuable, but they have different concerns. 
Though the legal and historical analyses are distinct, they also can 
inform each other in important ways. The diligent historian will want to 
know whether a president violated established legal doctrine. The careful 
judge, for her part, will account for history and context in her written 
opinion. 
That said, accumulated history is generally not considered the ultimate 
touchstone for constitutional meaning in the United States, as it is for the 
 
 1.  See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY’S 
VIEW OF HISTORY 1 (Henry Hardy & Aileen Kelly eds., 1966) (distinguishing between 
two types of intellectuals: hedgehogs, “who relate everything to a single central vision,” 
and foxes, “who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory”). 
 2.  See id. 
 3.  Historians are not the only ones who view events with a broader lens than 
lawyers judging the legality of particular action. To this extent, my “historian” is a 
construct encompassing not only academic historians but broader members of the 
informed public trying to assess events and figures through a generalist lens. See Gordon 
S. Wood, History and Myth, in THE PURPOSE OF THE PAST 249, 262 (2008).  
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British constitution.4 In some cases, the historian’s ultimate assessment—
and, indeed, society’s appraisal—of a president’s legacy will seem out of step 
with the lawyer’s. Indeed, oftentimes we assess a president’s general legacy 
with minimal attention to constitutional issues, at least as those issues might 
be analyzed by lawyers and judges in actual litigation.5 Put more bluntly, 
sometimes we celebrate presidents who broke the law. 
For someone who used to teach constitutional law, President Obama’s 
constitutional legacy includes some potentially serious blemishes, 
particularly involving his aggressive use of the executive power. He initiated 
wars in Libya and against ISIS without express congressional authorization.6 
He authorized numerous deadly drone strikes, including some on U.S. 
citizens (most famously Anwar al-Awlaki), arguably in violation of 
international and domestic law.7 On the domestic front, President Obama 
aggressively used his office and the administrative state to create new 
policies in several areas such as immigration, climate change, health care, 
gun control, overtime rules, and minimum wage.8 
I call these “potential” blemishes because there are colorable legal 
arguments to be made in support of each of these actions.9 Let us assume for 
the sake of argument, however, that some of these actions pushed 
constitutional boundaries, at best, and would be deemed illegal by a majority 
 
 4.  See Miguel Schor, The Other Path of Constitutionalism, 50 TULSA L. REV. 469, 
471 (2015) (noting that the principles of the Constitution of the United Kingdom are 
largely derived from the “best” practices of the British government).  
 5.   Cf. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 26 (2007) (“Constitutional maintenance is above all a 
political task. As such, it must be considered in political terms.”). 
 6.  See, e.g., Charlie Savage, An Army Captain Takes Obama to Court Over ISIS 
Fight, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/us/islamic-state-
war-powers-lawsuit-obama.html; Linton Weeks, If This Is Not ‘War’ Against Libya, 
What Is It?, NPR (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.NPR.org/2011/03/22/1347 
62513/If-this-is-not-war-against-libya-what-is-it.  
 7.  See, e.g., Scott Shane, The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 
27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-
awlaki.html.  
 8.  See, e.g., Rebecca Shabad, Obama’s Key Executive Actions, HILL (July 6, 2014), 
http://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/211303-obamas-key-executive-actions.   
 9.  In a short symposium contribution about a large topic, I must paint with a broad 
brush. This overview, therefore, does not purport to offer a thorough legal or political 
analysis of the various issues discussed, or a comprehensive discussion of all the 
constitutional issues to arise during the Obama presidency.  
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of fair-minded judges, at worst. My question here is whether history might 
forgive President Obama’s constitutional transgressions. In other words, 
might the court of history care less about constitutional rules than many 
lawyers would care to admit? 
II. THE SPECTRUM OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGACIES 
President Obama left office little over half a year ago, so it is too early 
to assess definitively his legacy, constitutional or otherwise. We can, 
however, look to past presidents to see if their legacies inform the 
relationship between the historical and legalist analyses. The obvious 
example is President Abraham Lincoln. Historians usually rate Lincoln as 
one of our nation’s greatest presidents.10 In our popular national mythology, 
too, Lincoln may be our greatest hero.  
Constitutional scholars, however, often point out that President 
Lincoln took several constitutionally suspect actions.11 He suspended habeas 
corpus, despite the fact that the Constitution appears to give the suspension 
power to Congress alone.12 He erected a naval blockade of the Confederacy, 
despite the fact that his legal justification for the blockade was in tension 
with his constitutional theory justifying the war to hold the Union together.13 
He instituted the first national conscription under the Militia Act, an act that 
one eminent commentator deemed “presidential legislation.”14 He 
permitted military tribunals to hear cases against civilians, even sometimes 
in northern states that had not seceded and where the courts remained 
 
 10.  For example, a Wikipedia entry aggregates the results of various surveys of 
historians and political scientists, and lists President Lincoln as the top-ranked president. 
See Historical Rankings of Presidents of the United States, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_rankings_of_presidents_of_the_United_States 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2017). Whether there is any merit to these kinds of rankings is, of 
course, a different question, but for my purposes, the important point is that President 
Lincoln is generally regarded very highly.  
 11.  See, e.g., JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 
513 (rev. ed. 1964) (“It is indeed a striking fact that Lincoln, who stands forth in popular 
conception as a great democrat, the exponent of liberty and of government by the 
people, was driven by circumstances to the use of more arbitrary power than perhaps 
any other President has seized.”). 
 12.  See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (D. Md. 1861).  
 13.  See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 641–42 (1862); Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. 
Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, 
in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 53, 58, 66 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. 
Bradley, eds., 2009). 
 14.  See RANDALL, supra note 11, at 239–74, 514. 
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open.15 He issued the Emancipation Proclamation, a noble and righteous 
action, no doubt, but also one that at the time raised thorny constitutional 
questions.16 
And yet, despite the fact that Lincoln pushed the Constitution to or 
beyond its limits on numerous occasions, he is regarded as one of the 
country’s finest presidents—and for good reason. Lincoln is the president 
credited with freeing the slaves, with saving the Union, and with leading the 
country successfully through its most traumatic episode. Lincoln’s 
constitutional infidelities—if they were that—were usually in service of 
noble goals.17 
Perhaps we should not be surprised that the country does not hold 
Lincoln’s constitutional infidelities against him. Historians, and arguably 
lawyers, are more willing to forgive constitutional excesses in times of crisis.18 
The Constitution might or might not build in implicit exceptions that would 
vindicate Lincoln’s actions under a legalist analysis,19 but the historical 
analysis surely permits careful consideration of such contextual factors. If 
any period in our history entitled the President to claim a constitutional 
“exception,”20 surely it was the Civil War. 
Lincoln’s legacy also benefits from the fact that his opponents—
primarily the seceding Confederates—are understood today to have violated 
the Constitution and basic human rights more than Lincoln did.21 Secession 
is the constitutional sin that overshadows whatever transgressions Lincoln 
might have authorized in response.22 And though the Constitution of 1787 
 
 15.  See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 29–30 (1866); DANIEL A. FARBER, LINCOLN’S 
CONSTITUTION 163–65 (2003).  
 16.  See FARBER, supra note 15, at 156–57; Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Lincoln, the 
Emancipation Proclamation, and Executive Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 100, 100–11 (2013).  
 17.  See FARBER, supra note 15, at 196. 
 18.  Cf. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A 
TIME OF WAR 224–55 (1998) (arguing that the Constitution still applies in times of war 
but speaks “with a somewhat different voice”).  
 19.  See id.; ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: 
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 11–12 (2010). 
 20.  See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 1–4 (2005) (exploring 
the “no-man’s-land between public law and political fact” and the “state of exception” 
which constitutes “law’s threshold”). 
 21.  See FARBER, supra note 15, at 144–46. 
 22.  See id. at 196.  
  
956 Drake Law Review [Vol. 65 
 
clearly protected it,23 slavery was such an evil that today we understand the 
Union to be righteous and the Confederacy depraved.24 Additionally, 
Lincoln’s immediate predecessor, James Buchanan, and successor, Andrew 
Johnson, manifestly lacked Lincoln’s moral vision, political skill, and 
nuanced constitutional understanding.25 Heroes need foils, and Lincoln had 
foils aplenty. 
Moreover, Lincoln took the Constitution seriously. He rarely acted 
without serious deliberation, and he carefully weighed the constitutional 
arguments for and against most of his actions.26 As Professor Farber argues, 
Lincoln was extraordinary because he saw the need to take dramatic action 
to save the Union, while simultaneously maintaining a sense of perspective 
about proper measures and their human and legal costs.27 
Indeed, to the extent he realized he was sometimes on constitutional 
thin ice, President Lincoln also took care to ensure that his measures were 
no broader than necessary. For example, when he first suspended habeas 
corpus, he did so only on the supply line between Philadelphia and 
Washington, D.C., to protect Union troops who had been attacked while 
switching trains in Baltimore.28 If he faced a temptation to suspend habeas 
more broadly then, Lincoln resisted it. 
Even so, it is worth emphasizing that Lincoln’s favorable legacy 
depends a good deal on circumstance. We are willing to forgive Lincoln’s 
constitutional record in large part because we deem him a great president. 
Had the war turned out differently, we likely would see Lincoln and his 
actions differently. Indeed, had the election of 1864 occurred a few months 
earlier (before some important Union battlefield victories), Lincoln may 
 
 23.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (three-fifths clause); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 
(protecting slave trade until 1808); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (fugitive slave clause). 
 24.  See, e.g., Confederate Monuments Are Coming Down Across the United States. 
Here’s a List., N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/16/us/ 
confederate-monuments-removed.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2017) (exemplifying the 
general modern attitude toward the Confederacy). 
 25.  See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, 177 (1989) [hereinafter FONER, RECONSTRUCTION] (noting 
that as president, Johnson found himself “thrust into a role that required tact, flexibility, 
and sensitivity to the nuances of public opinion–qualities Lincoln possessed in 
abundance, but that Johnson lacked”).  
 26.  See FARBER, supra note 15, at 198–99.  
 27.  See id. at 199.  
 28.  See id. at 158; BRIAN MCGINTY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT 70–71, 79 (2008).  
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well have lost, and his legacy would have been very different.29 
On the other end of the spectrum is President Richard Nixon, who lost 
his legal battle in the court of law30 and continues to lose in the court of 
history. The defining events of the Nixon presidency—Watergate and the 
subsequent cover-up—were egregious legal violations. For many 
Americans, Nixon epitomizes the corrupt, lawless president.31 
The differences between Lincoln and Nixon are obvious and 
numerous. Nixon unquestionably broke the law; the Supreme Court, indeed, 
unanimously rejected his constitutional argument to quash the subpoena for 
the tapes.32 Though subsequent commentators have criticized the Court’s 
reasoning, most agree that the result was correct.33 By contrast, reasonable 
people disagree about whether some of Lincoln’s controversial actions did 
in fact violate the Constitution.34 
Even if we assume, however, that Lincoln did break the law, his 
violations look very different from Nixon’s. If Lincoln violated the 
Constitution, he did so for the noble causes of saving the Union and 
(eventually) freeing the slaves.35 Lincoln also guided the country through the 
greatest calamity in its history, and he was well aware that the Founders’ 
constitutional experiment would likely perish if the Union did not win the 
war.36 As he asked when he initially suspended habeas corpus, “[A]re all the 
laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest 
 
 29.  See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 
770–71 (1988).  
 30.  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714–16 (1974). 
 31.  See Julian Zelizer, Distrustful Americans Still Live in Age of Watergate, CNN 
(July 7, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/07/opinion/zelizer-watergate-politics/ 
index.html.  
 32.  See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 685–86 (1974) (Justice Rehnquist took no part). 
 33.   See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1405, 1405 
(1999). 
 34.  Professor Farber, for instance, points out that many of Lincoln’s controversial 
actions were consistent with Congress’s intentions. See FARBER, supra note 15, at 132–
38. 
 35.  Id. at 196–200. Though Lincoln genuinely loathed slavery, his public stances 
towards the institution changed both before and during his presidency. See generally 
ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY (2010) 
[hereinafter FONER, FIERY TRIAL] (tracing President Lincoln’s ideas and policies on 
slavery). 
 36.  See Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (transcript available 
at the U.S. National Archives & Records Administration).  
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that one be violated?”37 
Nixon’s constitutional theory, by comparison, was purely self-serving. 
The break-in at the Democratic National Committee Watergate 
headquarters and the subsequent cover-up served only Nixon’s political 
interests.38 Moreover, Nixon’s constitutional argument that “separation of 
powers doctrine precludes judicial review of a President’s claim of privilege” 
conveniently would have protected Nixon from disclosing incriminating 
information.39 The country, of course, did face serious problems, but Nixon’s 
bogus assertion of executive privilege was not directed at solving them.40 The 
court of history is more willing to forgive abuses committed toward national, 
rather than selfish, ends. Of course, it is often debatable which ends are 
selfish, but in the cases of Lincoln and Nixon, the answers are mostly 
uncontroversial. 
The presidents’ personal characteristics also distinguish them. 
Americans admire Lincoln in part because of his qualities as a man: his 
empathy, his intellectual rigor, his folksy humor, and his “capacity for 
growth.”41 Nixon, though highly competent, possessed few endearing 
qualities, deficiencies that likely contribute to his unfortunate legacy.42 
The quick contrast between Lincoln and Nixon serves to demonstrate 
that context, including nonlegal factors, matters.43 Some legalists may give 
both Lincoln and Nixon low scores for their constitutional legacy, but most 
historians will rate Lincoln highly and Nixon poorly.44 Phrased somewhat 
 
 37.  MCGINTY, supra note 28, at 81 (alteration in original) (quoting Abraham 
Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 403 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953–1955)). 
 38.  See Christopher H. Schroeder, The Story of United States v. Nixon: The 
President and the Tapes, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 343 (Christopher H. 
Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
 39. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974). 
 40. See Schroeder, supra note 38, at 329–30, 343.  
 41.  FONER, FIERY TRIAL, supra note 35, at xix.  
 42.  See 40 Years After Watergate, A Look Back at Nixon’s Downfall, NPR (May 21, 
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/314596874/40-years-after-watergate-a-look-back-
at-nixon-s-downfall.  
 43.   Needless to say, a symposium contribution cannot examine the many other 
presidents whose legacies fall elsewhere on the spectrum.  For a fascinating study 
examining several presidencies, see generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS 
PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993). 
 44.  See, e.g., Presidential Historians Survey 2017, C-SPAN, https://www.c-
span.org/presidentsurvey2017/?page=overall (last visited Sept. 9, 2017).  
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differently, a president’s general legacy will often matter much more than 
his constitutional legacy. Constitutional transgressions matter, but perhaps 
more so when they reinforce an unfavorable legacy more generally. Nixon’s 
conception of near-absolute executive privilege has defined his legacy 
because it fits the broader Watergate narrative of “Nixon the crook.”45 
Nixon—the man and the President—was obviously more complicated, and 
his presidency included some important successes that helped the country.46 
Nevertheless, President Nixon’s legacy, constitutional and otherwise, is 
shaped by the Watergate scandal and his response to it. 
Lincoln’s legacy, by contrast, transcends his constitutionally 
questionable decisions. Interestingly, this is probably not because we now 
accept Lincoln’s constitutional arguments.47 To the contrary, lawyers usually 
do not assume today that Lincoln’s example necessarily vindicates similar 
subsequent presidential actions.48 Rather, when we assess Lincoln’s legacy 
generally, we forgive his constitutional excesses. 
This is an obvious point, but it can be lost on lawyers, who sometimes 
think of legal questions as binary—that is, of actions as either legal or 
illegal.49 Judges, after all, must decide how to rule in each case. Historical 
analysis is inherently more open ended. The historian, whether professional 
or lay, can identify unconstitutional actions, but unlike the judge, such a 
finding need not conclude the analysis. The historian can search for 
explanations, examine tensions, and highlight paradoxes.50 The historian can 
also take account of subsequent generations’ moral attitudes. Whereas the 
judge must focus (or, at a minimum, appear to focus) on legal analyses, the 
 
 45.  See, e.g., Amar, supra note 33, at 1405–07.  
 46.  See, e.g., Joan Hoff, Nixon Had Some Successes, Before His Disgrace, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 13, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/13/did-any-
good-come-of-watergate/nixon-had-some-successes-before-his-disgrace. 
 47.  See Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the 
Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional?: Do We/Should We Care What the Answer 
Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 1148–50 (2001) [hereinafter Levinson, Was the 
Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional?].   
 48.  See FARBER, supra note 15, at 197.  
 49.  See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 861–62 (1992).  
 50.   See, e.g., Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PENN. J. CONST. L.  329, 
367–68 (2013); Jack N. Rakove, Confessions of an Ambivalent Originalist, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1346, 1347 (2003) (“Unlike lawyers, we [historians] are not trained to speak with 
the voice of the advocate or the adversary. . . . The nuance, subtlety, and respect for 
ambiguity that we [historians] cherish and relish in our research cannot easily be 
translated into urgent political discussion.”). 
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historian, like society more generally, can engage with the president’s values 
and vision, as well as his ability “to advance his agenda and to maintain his 
political coalition.”51 To this extent, the historian is likely to go beyond 
judge-made constitutional doctrine and examine the complex web of 
institutional, ideological, legal, and partisan commitments that 
simultaneously empower and constrain the president.52 Of course, historians 
exploring these issues do not often consciously seek to define the legacy of 
public figures, but their projects contribute to those legacies. Those projects 
usually consider much more than whether a public actor followed the letter 
of the law. 
III. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S LEGACY: SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS 
How, then, will history judge President Obama’s legacy in light of these 
broader factors? It is fair to say that Barack Obama was neither a Lincoln 
nor a Nixon. Though I greatly admire him, I do not think President Obama 
will be remembered as one of the country’s greatest presidents. I am also 
confident he will not be remembered as one of the worst. Even critics who 
disliked the Obama presidency must concede that he was no crook.53 Like 
most presidents, Obama’s legacy will be mixed. 
Of course, it is difficult to assess a president’s legacy without reference 
 
 51.  WHITTINGTON, supra note 5, at 18; see also Levinson, Was the Emancipation 
Proclamation Constitutional?, supra note 47, at 1150 (“When all is said and done, we 
place far greater emphasis on whether we substantively like the outcomes, than on their 
legal pedigree.”). 
 52.   See WHITTINGTON, supra note 5, at 22. 
 53.   Though “scandals” are often in the eye of the beholder, the Obama White 
House, unlike many recent presidents, lacked a major scandal. See Glenn Kessler, Has 
the Obama White House Been ‘Historically Free of Scandal’?, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/01/19/has-the-
obama-white-house-been-historically-free-of-scandal/?utm_term=.db4a81ca55db. 
Political opponents complained about the IRS’s alleged targeting of conservative 
political groups seeking tax-exempt status. This narrative, if true, would point to an 
appalling abuse of power (though one not necessarily linked directly to the President). 
In all events, recent findings by the Department of the Treasury’s Inspector General 
indicate that the IRS similarly scrutinized organizations associated with liberal causes 
and likely put the political firestorm to rest. See Alan Rappeport, In Targeting Political 
Groups, I.R.S. Crossed Party Lines, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/politics/irs-targeting-tea-party-liberals-
democrats.html?_r=0.  
  
2017] Of Law and Legacies  961 
 
to one’s own normative biases.54 Indeed, the historical inquiry, like the 
legalist inquiry, is value laden. Historians, both lay and professional, will 
disagree with each other, just as judges do. 
With that major caveat, I think President Obama’s general legacy will 
be much more positive than negative. Obama inherited very difficult 
situations and in many respects left the country much better than it was when 
he took office.55 Perhaps most notably, he came to office during the country’s 
greatest economic crisis in 70 years, and his policies helped avert economic 
catastrophe.56 While no president deserves too much credit (or blame) for 
the economy, the unemployment rate, which had peaked at 10 percent early 
in the Obama presidency, was down to 4.7 percent by the time he left office.57 
As one commentator put it, “If other policy decisions had been made, things 
could have been very different, and much worse.”58 
Obama also changed the national debate on important issues, 
especially health care. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is undoubtedly a 
flawed statute, but it cut the number of uninsured Americans nearly in half.59 
Not everybody thinks this is a good thing, but the law has changed the debate 
surrounding health insurance.60 As a result, even Republicans who loathe 
the ACA have not been able to agree on a replacement.61 Were it not for 
President Obama, the fate of 20 million people’s health insurance likely 
would not have had enough political salience to fracture the Republican 
 
 54.   To that extent, I fully admit that my own views have partially shaped my analysis 
here, though I have also tried to be fair-minded. 
 55. See John Cassidy, Obama’s Economic Record: An Assessment, NEW YORKER, 
(Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/obamas-economic-record-
an-assessment. 
 56.  See id.  
 57.  See id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See Louise Radnofsky, Percentage of Uninsured Historically Low, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/percentage-of-uninsured-historically-low-
1473220802.  
 60.  See Gary Westphalen & Serena Marshall, The Obama Legacy: A Promise of 
Hope, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/deepdive/obama-legacy-promise-
hope-44597110 (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).  
 61.  See Robert Y. Shapiro & Greg M. Shaw, Why Can’t the Senate Repeal 
Obamacare? Because Its Policies Are Actually Popular, WASH. POST (July 19, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/19/why-cant-the-
senate-repeal-obamacare-because-its-actual-policies-are-
popular/?utm_term=.432fa31202e4. 
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Party as it has in 2017.62 It is too early to assess the long-term policy 
implications of these developments, but the effect on the national debate has 
been significant. 
President Obama also served in profoundly divisive times63 and carried 
himself with unfailing dignity and grace. Compared to many colleagues from 
both parties in Congress, President Obama often seemed like the only 
grownup in the room.64 In an era of intense political vitriol, President Obama 
modeled respectful, thoughtful discourse.65 
President Obama’s political opponents undoubtedly contest these 
characterizations. Some also hasten to enumerate his unconstitutional 
actions.66 Such rhetoric may be politically effective, but it fails to wrestle with 
the issues’ legal complexities. This is not to say that all these lists’ conclusions 
are necessarily wrong, but rather that in many cases there are reasonable 
(and complicated) arguments to be made on each side.67  
More to the point, even assuming arguendo that President Obama 
violated the Constitution on some occasions, that conclusion on its own tells 
us little about the Obama legacy more generally. When Americans look back 
on a president’s constitutional decisions, they do not do so in a vacuum.  We 
should, of course, ask how lawyers would analyze particular actions, but we 
should also recognize that the legalist analysis is often but a splotch on the 
historian’s wider canvas.  
 
 62.  See id. 
 63.  See Michael Dimock, How America Changed During Barack Obama’s 
Presidency, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/2017/01/ 
10/how-america-changed-during-barack-obamas-presidency/.  
 64.  See, e.g., Rep. Wilson Shouts, ‘You Lie’ to Obama During Speech, CNN POL. 
(Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/09/joe.wilson/. 
 65.  See The Times Editorial Board, Farewell to Barack Obama: A Humane, 
Intelligent, and (Mostly) Effective Leader, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-obama-appraisal-20170114-story.html.  
 66.   See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, President Obama’s Top 10 Constitutional Violations of 
2013, FORBES (Dec. 23, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/ 
12/23/president-obamas-top-10-constitutional-violations-of-2013/#5ea526bb7667; Ilya 
Shapiro, Top 10 Ways Obama Violated The Constitution During His Presidency, 
FEDERALIST (Jan. 19, 2017), http://thefederalist.com/2017/01/19/10-ways-obama-
violated-constitution-presidency/.  
 67.   Cf. Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 667, 671–78 (2015) [hereinafter, Berger, Rhetoric] (lamenting the certainty of tone 
that pervades much rhetoric about the Constitution). 
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A. Foreign Affairs 
With those more general (and admittedly contestable) observations in 
mind, how would the legalist evaluate President Obama’s constitutional 
legacy? On the foreign affairs front, Obama authorized repeated drone 
strikes—including against U.S. citizens—in places like Yemen and Somalia.  
He also ordered the assassination of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan68 and 
initiated military action, without express congressional authorization, 
against Moammar Qaddafi in Libya and against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.69 
There certainly are legal arguments to be made against these actions. 
Commentators disagree about what circumstances beyond self-defense, if 
any, permit the president to authorize force abroad without congressional 
authorization.70 However, even if we infer from our history that the president 
sometimes has authority to take military action without congressional 
authorization,71 it is far from clear that the circumstances here necessitated 
unilateral executive action.72 Qaddafi was a brutal dictator, but he posed a 
minimal threat to the United States.73  
Similarly, while ISIS is unquestionably dangerous, it is less clear how 
much of a direct threat it poses to the United States’ national security.74 Most 
of its atrocities during the Obama years were committed in Syria and Iraq, 
 
 68.  Razzan Nakhlawi, The Kill List: Islamic State Leaders Taken off the Battlefield, 
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-targeted-
killings-drone-snap-htmlstory.html.  
 69.  In light of justiciability doctrines like standing and the political question 
doctrine, judges might not tackle such issues often, even if the president does act 
unconstitutionally. However, lawyers advising the president on such action, such as those 
in the Office of Legal Counsel, can draw legal lines, as can the legal academy.  
 70.  See, e.g., Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 
YALE L. J. 2512, 2514–15 (2006) (summarizing different scholarly views). 
 71.  See Lori Fisher Damrosch, Comment, War and Uncertainty, 114 YALE L.J. 1405, 
1408 (2005) (“Only nine times has Congress acted with bright-line clarity to authorize 
initiation of major combat.”).  
 72.  See, e.g., Deborah Pearlstein, Syria Insta-Symposium: The President’s Wise 
Decision, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 1, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/01/presidents-wise-
decision/.  
 73.  See Stephen Zunes, Libya, the United States, and the Anti-Gaddafi Revolt, 
HUFFPOST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephenzunes/libya-the-united-states-a_b_ 
828199.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2017). 
 74.  See Massimo Calabresi, Understanding the ISIS Threat to Americans at Home, 
TIME (Sept. 9, 2014), http://time.com/3313613/isis-barack-obama-terrorism-threat/.  
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or in Europe.75 Indeed, some critics have argued that U.S. intervention 
against ISIS in Syria and Iraq may increase the risk to our country by 
inspiring future attacks.76 Even were this projection inaccurate, it is hard to 
see how military action in the Middle East helps protect the country against 
ISIS-inspired attacks in the United States, such as the terrible shooting in 
Orlando, which was committed by a radicalized U.S.-born citizen.77 
Additionally, the Obama Administration’s claim that Congress’s 2001 
Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorized its war 
against ISIS strained credulity.78 The AUMF was an immediate response to 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and targeted al Qaeda and the 
Taliban.79 Though ISIS, like al Qaeda, is an extremist Sunni terrorist 
 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  See, e.g., Peter Beinart, Why Attacking ISIS Won’t Make Americans Safer, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/03/why-
attacking-isis-wont-make-americans-safer/426861/ (stating that sending more U.S. 
troops to Iraq and Syria would likely spark more terrorism against the United States, at 
least in the short term); David Coates, Weighing the Arguments on U.S. Military Action 
Against ISIS, HUFFPOST (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-
coates/weighing-the-arguments-on_b_6830606.html; Richard Lebaron, Should We Go to 
War Against ISIS?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/should-we-
go-war-against-isis-395653 (indicating increasing U.S. effort might increase the risk in 
the United States where ISIS has not been a significant threat). 
 77.  See Ralph Ellis et al., Orlando Shooting: 49 Killed, Shooter Pledged ISIS 
Allegiance, CNN (June 13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-
shooting/.  
 78.  See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The Perils of Obama’s Latest Undeclared War, 
ATLANTIC, (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/the-
perils-of-president-obamas-latest-undeclared-war/413566/ (“Obama just keeps 
pretending that he isn’t quite waging war.”); Jack Goldsmith, Obama’s Breathtaking 
Expansion of a President’s Power to Make War, TIME, (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://time.com/3326689/obama-isis-war-powers-bush/ http://time.com/3326689/obama-
isis-war-powers-bush/ [hereinafter Goldsmith, Obama’s Breathtaking Expansion] (“The 
President’s gambit is, at bottom, presidential unilateralism masquerading as implausible 
statutory interpretation.”).   
 79.  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). Interestingly, President Obama chose to justify his military actions on statutory 
grounds, in contrast to President George W. Bush’s aggressive assertions of Article II 
authority. See Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority: 
The Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 871, 871–73 
(2007) (“It is no secret that the administration of President George W. Bush has 
consistently asserted a breathtakingly broad view of the scope of executive authority 
under Article II of the United States Constitution.”); Mary Louise Kelly, When the U.S. 
Military Strikes, White House Points to a 2001 Measure, NPR (Sept. 6, 2016), 
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organization, its strategy, theology, and goals differ substantially from al 
Qaeda’s.80 ISIS did not even exist when Congress passed the AUMF.81 The 
AUMF did not grant the President authority to wage war against all Islamic 
terrorism in perpetuity.82 Moreover, Congress did not signal to President 
Obama that it approved of his actions against ISIS.83 To this extent, 
President Obama’s aggressive use of the military seemed an end run around 
Congress and the War Powers Resolution of 1973.84 
Furthermore, Congress did not retroactively approve Obama’s actions 
(at least not while he was still in office).85  Though Lincoln was probably 
incorrect when he asserted that the President possessed the suspension 
power, Congress almost certainly would have suspended the writ at his 
request, had it been able to convene.86 Indeed, Congress ultimately signaled 
its assent by passing a statute permitting the President to suspend the writ.87 
President Obama could point to no retroactive congressional approval of his 
military actions against Qaddafi or ISIS.88 
Nor did international law appear to give legal cover to the President’s 
 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/09/06/492857888/when-the-u-s-military-
strikes-white-house-points-to-a-2001-measure. 
 80.  See Ali Rod Khadem, Why Should Law and Policy Makers Understand 
Extremist Beliefs? The Islamic State (ISIS) as a Case Study: Past, Present, and Future 31–
45 (unpublished manuscript) (discussing the political, tactical, and theological 
differences between Al Qaeda and ISIS). 
 81.  See id. at 23. 
 82.  See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001) (articulating the purpose as authorizing “the use of United States Armed 
Forces against those responsible for the recent [9/11] attacks launched against the United 
States”) (emphasis added); Deborah Pearlstein, Is It Legal? No., OPINIO JURIS, (Sept. 11, 
2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/11/legal/; Jens David Ohlin, The 9/11 AUMF Does 
Not Cover ISIS, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 11, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/11/911-
aumf-cover-isis/.  
 83.  See Friedersdorf, supra note 78.  
 84.  Some presidents, of course, have contested the constitutionality of features of 
the War Powers Resolution. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
941, 1109 n.665 (2008). 
 85. See Frierdersdorf, supra note 78.  One wonders whether members of Congress 
may now approve similar actions taken by a different president. See infra note 151 and 
accompanying text. 
 86.  FARBER, supra note 15, at 158–61. 
 87.  See id. at 159. 
 88.  See Frierdersdorf, supra note 78. 
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actions. For example, with regards to the bombing in Syria, there was no 
United Nations Security Council resolution and no apparent claim that the 
U.S. Government was acting in self-defense.89 Some commentators sought 
to justify the action on humanitarian grounds.90 However, as Professor 
Pearlstein argued at the time, the law did not clearly support such a theory, 
and the U.S. Government’s behavior calls into serious question whether the 
government genuinely acted for humanitarian reasons.91 
At the same time, the President’s unilateral military actions in Libya 
and against ISIS were not without precedent. In recent decades, U.S. 
presidents have unilaterally initiated smaller wars in places like Grenada, 
Panama, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.92 Admittedly, some of these 
interventions may be distinguishable on various grounds. For example, some 
lasted fewer than 60 days and therefore would have fit within the War 
Powers Resolution.93 Other interventions were arguably pursuant to treaty 
obligations and therefore should be evaluated according to different legal 
criteria.94 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that U.S. presidents in recent decades 
have repeatedly committed military force without congressional 
authorization.95 This precedent should not mean that a president may always 
act without constitutional constraint in the field of military affairs. Past 
practices, however, matter to both historians and judges.96 President 
 
 89.  See Deborah Pearlstein, Not Even the Brits Can Make the Case Bombing Syria 
Is Lawful, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 30, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/30/even-brits-
can-make-case-bombing-syria-lawful/ [hereinafter Pearlstein, Not Even the Brits Can 
Make the Case].  
 90.  See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Another Legal View of the Dissent Channel Cable 
on Syria, JUST SECURITY (June 20, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
31571/legal-view-dissent-channel-cable-syria/. 
 91.  Pearlstein, Not Even the Brits Can Make the Case, supra note 89.  
 92.  See SANFORD LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE 
FEDERALIST IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 268 (2015) [hereinafter LEVINSON, AN 
ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL]; Marty Lederman, Syria Insta-Symposium: Marty Lederman 
Part I—The Constitution, the Charter, and Their Intersection, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 1, 
2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/01/syria-insta-symposium-marty-lederman-part-
constitution-charter-intersection/.  
 93.  See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012); Lederman, supra note 92.  
 94.  See Lederman, supra note 92. 
 95.  See Damrosch, supra note 71, at 1409. 
 96.  See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tubing Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597–602 
(1952). 
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Obama’s military interventions in Libya, Iraq, and Syria may be hard to 
defend in terms of constitutional text, the War Powers Resolution, or 
congressional action. Measured against his predecessors’ actions, however, 
his interventions seem consistent with common executive practices in recent 
decades.97 Moreover, Congress did not cut off military funding to prevent 
President Obama’s interventions, suggesting some degree of legislative 
acquiescence.98 
Further complicating the analysis, Congress put President Obama in an 
impossible situation. President Obama inherited difficult problems, 
including ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and an unstable Middle East 
region that soon erupted in widespread unrest and violence.99 Nevertheless, 
few members of Congress were willing to engage seriously with these 
dangers. Congress did not want to give the President the authority to fight 
ISIS, but it also did not want to limit his authority either.100 Members of 
Congress realized that each approach had serious downsides and that it was 
politically more perilous to take a stand than not.101 Congress here didn’t so 
much disagree with the President as punt the decision to him, knowing it 
could criticize him for whatever he did.102 
Past executive practice is a contextual factor that both historians and 
 
 97.  See Lederman, supra note 92.  
 98.  See Benjamin Wittes, The AUMF is Dead. Long Live the AUMF, LAWFARE 
(Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/aumf-dead-long-live-aumf; see also Kate 
Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1352 (1988) (noting that 
appropriations “are not only legislative specifications of money amounts, but also 
legislative specifications of the powers, activities, and purposes—what we may call, 
simply, ‘objects’—for which the appropriated funds may be used”); Fred Kaplan, Empty 
Threats, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
war_stories/2015/02/congress_will_authorize_president_obama_s_war_on_isis_legislato
rs_don_t.html. 
 99.  See, e.g., Scott Anderson, Fractured Lands: How the Arab World Came Apart, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2016/08/11/magazine/isis-middle-east-arab-spring-fractured-lands.html.  
 100.  See Russell Berman, The War Against ISIS Will Go Undeclared, ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-war-against-
isis-will-go-undeclared/390618/. 
 101.  See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Neither Obama Nor Congress Seems Eager for a 
Vote on Military Action in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/us/politics/in-washington-little-appetite-for-a-vote 
-on-iraq.html.  
 102.  See id.  
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judges consider as part of the constitutional calculus.103 Congressional bad 
faith, by contrast, is not. The legality of unilateral presidential action does 
not turn on whether Congress has been cooperative.104 
Historians, however, can take account of congressional behavior, and 
this perspective shines new light on President Obama’s unilateralism.105 
Admittedly, Obama, unlike Lincoln, did not confront challenges that 
threatened the very existence of the nation.106 Nevertheless, the dangers he 
confronted were serious, and historians evaluating the actions against ISIS 
may offer President Obama more of a constitutional pass than lawyers 
would. Congress’s political cowardice put the President in an impossible 
position.107 The President himself made this very point, telling Congress, 
“Guys, you can’t have it both ways here. . . . You can’t be ducking and 
dodging and hiding under the table when it comes time to vote, and then 
complain about the president not coming to you . . . .”108 
As a legal matter, the President probably had it wrong; Congress can 
have it both ways. Nothing requires Congress to bring questions of foreign 
policy to a vote or to refrain from criticizing the president. While context 
and past practices are part of the legal inquiry, a legalist analysis could 
reasonably (though not necessarily) conclude that President Obama’s 
unilateral military interventions exceeded his authority.109 
Where the law is sometimes blind, though, historians can still take 
notice. However much we lament the President’s failure to get congressional 
approval, we must also recognize that he believed innocent people’s lives 
 
 103.  See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tubing Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597–602 
(1952); FARBER, supra note 15, at 148–49. 
 104.  Cf. Jack Goldsmith, Why the President Should Seek Congressional 
Authorization for the Use of Force Against the Islamic State [UPDATE on War Powers 
Resolution], LAWFARE (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-president-
should-seek-congressional-authorization-use-force-against-islamic-state-update-war. 
 105.  See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama 
Administration’s Commitment to Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, 2014 UTAH L. 
REV. 773, 788–90. 
 106.  See FARBER, supra note 15, at 14–15.  
 107.  See Hirschfeld Davis, supra note 101. As Senator Tim Kaine put it, “This is not 
about an imperial presidency. It’s about a Congress that’s reluctant to cast tough votes 
on U.S. military action.” Id.  
 108.  Id.  
 109.  See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Obama’s Constitutional Legacy, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/19/obamas 
-constitutional-legacy/?utm_term=.cd44b5dd7801. 
  
2017] Of Law and Legacies  969 
 
were at stake, national security was threatened, and Congress would not 
engage.110 The President responded by doing what he thought was best for 
the nation’s security and basic human rights.111 Historians assessing these 
episodes will likely judge Congress harshly for refusing to engage with such 
pressing matters. By comparison, President Obama, though imperfect, will 
probably look much better. 
B. Domestic Policy 
On the domestic front, Obama also encountered congressional 
obstruction. During the first two years of the Obama presidency, Congress 
passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (a major 
economic stimulus package),112 the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (a financial regulation statute),113 and the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (a major overhaul of the country’s 
health care system).114 In 2010, however, Republicans gained back a Senate 
seat to deprive the Democrats of their filibuster-proof majority.115 Later that 
year, Republicans retook the House.116 
 
 110.  See President Barak Obama, Remarks by the President on the Administration’s 
Approach to Counterterrorism, (Dec. 6, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
the-press-office/2016/12/06/remarks-president-administrations-approach-
counterterrorism.  
 111.  See id. See generally Oona A. Hathaway et al., Consent-Based Humanitarian 
Intervention: Giving Sovereign Responsibility Back to the Sovereign, 46 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 499, 502–03 (2013) (offering consent-based intervention as a way to reconcile the 
tension between sovereignty norms militating against humanitarian intervention 
unauthorized by the U.N. Security Council and human rights proponents who believe 
human rights norms should trump state sovereignty concerns). 
 112.   See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 123 Stat. 115. 
 113.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5301 (2012). 
 114.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012). The 
ACA raised important constitutional questions. The Supreme Court upheld most of the 
statute, though it held that the Medicaid expansion provision exceeded Congress’s 
Spending Clause power, and the Court also indicated that the individual mandate 
exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 
(2012). This contribution focuses primarily on President Obama’s executive actions, 
though legislation he championed, of course, will also be part of his constitutional legacy.  
 115.  See Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html?_r=0.  
 116.  See Jeff Zeleny, G.O.P. Captures House, but Not Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03elect.html?pagewanted=all.  
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From that point on, time and again, Congress refused to work with 
President Obama on almost anything.117 As with foreign policy, the Obama 
Administration responded to this legislative resistance by acting without 
Congress when it could.118 The Environmental Protection Agency 
promulgated several important regulations, such as the Clean Power Plan, 
limiting power plants’ greenhouse gas pollution.119 Knowing that it lacked 
the resources to deport all illegal immigrants, the Department of Homeland 
Security implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents (DAPA) programs, establishing criteria for determining when 
officials enforce immigration laws.120 And, of course, agencies, such as the 
Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Health and Human 
Services, helped implement the ACA.121 In short, President Obama pushed 
significant policy decisions through administrative action without going 
through Congress. 
As a descriptive matter, there is nothing unusual about this. The 
President’s policymaking power has increased through the generations, in 
substantial part due to presidents’ increased directive authority over the 
administrative state.122 President Obama’s critics accused him of usurping 
Congress’s legislative role,123 but U.S. presidents, starting with President 
 
 117.  See Jennifer Steinhauer, G.O.P. vs. Obama: Disrespect or Just Politics?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/us/politics/02cong.html. 
 118.  See Binyamin Applebaum & Michael D. Shear, Once Skeptical of Executive 
Power, Obama Has Come to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/us/politics/obama-era-legacy-regulation.html.  
 119. See Robinson Meyer, How Obama Could Lose His Big Climate Case, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 29, 2016), theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/09/obama-clean-power-plan-dc-
circuit-legal/502115/.  
 120.  See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law 
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 138–40 (2015).  
 121.  See Adam Sonfield, Implementing the Affordable Care Act: Enrollment 
Strategies and the U.S. Family Planning Effort, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 8, 2011), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2011/11/implementing-affordable-care-act-enrollment-
strategies-and-us-family-planning-effort.  
 122.  See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277–
319 (2001) (discussing the “sea change”—beginning during the Reagan Administration 
and continuing during the Clinton Administration—that gave the President far more 
policy influence over administrative agencies). 
 123.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Slattery & Andrew Kloster, An Executive Unbound: The 
Obama Administration’s Unilateral Actions, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/executive-unbound-the-obama-
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Reagan, have wielded very substantial domestic policymaking authority 
through administrative agencies.124 Though in theory the President’s control 
over independent agencies should be reduced because he can only remove 
their leaders for cause (as opposed to executive agencies, whose leaders he 
may fire at will), in practice, the President exerts significant power over most 
administrative agencies.125 We might quibble with the legality and wisdom of 
particular administrative actions, but it is simply wrong to suggest that 
President Obama’s reliance on administrative agencies to further policy 
goals was anomalous. 
Thus, in most instances, the legal questions surrounding Obama’s 
domestic executive actions implicated not constitutional law, but 
administrative law and statutory interpretation.126 Did the agency act 
properly given its statutory mandate? Did it employ proper administrative 
procedures? Constitutional norms may inform those inquiries, but they are, 
for the time being, primarily statutory and administrative ones.127  
While Republicans accused President Obama of exceeding his 
executive powers, Obama’s supporters responded that Congress was 
historically inert during the Obama years, at least after 2010.128 The country 
faced numerous difficulties, and Congress, despite the President’s pleas, did 
nothing.129 Congressional Republicans seemed to follow a simple rule: if 
President Obama favored something, they opposed it.130 As one reporter put 
 
administrations-unilateral-actions.  
 124.  See Kagan, supra note 122, at 2277 (explaining that President Reagan broke 
from past presidential practices by “self-consciously and openly adopt[ing] strategies to 
exert” influence over agency policy). 
 125.  See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 19, at 6. 
 126.  See Garrett Epps, Obama Leaves the Constitution Weaker than He Found It, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/obama-
leaves-the-constitution-weaker-than-he-found-it/512015/.  
 127.   Should Justice Gorsuch and other Justices revive the nondelegation doctrine or 
other doctrines challenging the legitimacy of the administrative state, these inquiries 
could once again become constitutional.  See generally Kevin Russell, Judge Gorsuch on 
Separation of Powers and Federalism, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 15, 2017), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/judge-gorsuch-separation-powers-federalism/ 
(discussing then-Judge Gorsuch’s views on the administrative state). 
 128.  See, e.g., Ezra Klein, Goodbye and Good Riddance, 112th Congress, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 4, 2013), https://washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/04/goodbye-
and-good-riddance-112th-congress/?utm_term=.7cc0b742F985. 
 129.  See id.  
 130. See Michael Grunwald, The Victory of ‘No’, POLITICO MAG. (Dec. 4, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/republican-party-obstructionism-
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it, the Republicans treated Obama “not just as a [P]resident from the 
opposing party but an extreme threat to the American way of life.”131   
President Obama’s willingness to resort to administrative regulation 
needs to be understood in light of a Republican Congress whose raison 
d’être was to see him fail. Of course, the Constitution’s requirement of 
bicameralism and presentment makes legislation hard to pass in all events,132 
and various congressional rules and practices make it still harder, even in 
saner political times.133 But congressional paralysis during the Obama years 
was especially acute.134 
The legalist and historical analyses, thus, will likely diverge here, as 
well. The law does not particularly care if the President took administrative 
action because Congress refused to act. Administrative regulations must 
stand or fall on their own legal merits. This is not to say that any particular 
Obama-era regulation was illegal, but that the administrative law analysis 
for assessing those regulations’ legality would not typically examine 
congressional behavior.  
Historians and members of society more generally, however, do care 
about political motives, and their perceptions of those motives can color the 
way they remember presidents and congresses.135 There are countless 
differences between Lincoln’s and Nixon’s constitutional transgressions, but 
motive was an important one. History has deemed Lincoln’s motives 
disinterested and Nixon’s self-serving. A good deal of our country’s 
collective historical consciousness about those two figures flows from those 
assessments.136  
 
victory-trump-214498.  
 131.  Id.  
 132.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.  
 133.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1441, 1442–43 (2008). 
 134.  See, e.g., Phillip Bump, It’s a Holiday Miracle! The 113th Congress (Probably) 
Wasn’t the Least Productive Ever!, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/12/19/its-a-holiday-miracle-the-
113th-probably-wasnt-the-least-productive-ever/?utm_term=.0d42e76a888a (“The 
113th was barely not the least productive Congress in recent history.”); Klein, supra note 
128 (noting that the 112th Congress was unproductive compared to any other Congress 
since 1948). 
 135.  See, e.g., Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional?, supra 
note 47 at 1150–51. 
 136.  See supra text accompanying notes 35–38.  
  
2017] Of Law and Legacies  973 
 
C. Constitutional Hardball and the Obama Legacy 
How then will historians see the motives of President Obama and 
Congress from 2010 to 2016? These judgments are difficult to make without 
the benefit of some distance. That said, even at this early stage we can offer 
some tentative reactions, and they do not shine a flattering light on Congress. 
To be sure, President Obama’s inability to negotiate successfully with 
Congress will surely inform his legacy. That said, congressional attitudes 
towards President Obama will probably negatively impact those Congresses’ 
legacies more than the President’s.  
Some of congressional Republicans’ obstruction can be chalked up to 
genuine ideological differences with the President, but much of it was politics 
at its worst.137 Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, indeed, announced 
that his “number one priority is making sure President Obama’s a one-term 
president.”138 Top Republican congressional leaders, including 
Representatives Paul Ryan, Eric Cantor, and Kevin McCarthy, met the night 
of President Obama’s inauguration to devise a plan to “mortally wound” the 
President politically.139 Compromise was not part of congressional 
Republicans’ game plan, committed as they were to what Professor Tushnet 
has called “constitutional hardball.”140 Congress’s primary objective for the 
last six years of the Obama presidency was to obstruct anything the President 
wanted, even if workable compromises might have been available.141  
 
 137.  I concede that observers who do not share my view of these Congresses will 
most likely view President Obama’s tenure differently.  
 138.  See Glenn Kessler, When Did McConnell Say He Wanted to Make Obama a 
‘One-Term President’?, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/fact-checker/post/when-did-mcconnell-say-he-wanted-to-make-obama-a-one-
term-president/2012/09/24/79fd5cd8-0696-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_blog.html?utm_term 
=.a1ee2a6520bc (attributing quote to an interview to the National Journal from Oct. 23, 
2010). 
 139.   See ROBERT DRAPER, DO NOT ASK WHAT GOOD WE DO: INSIDE THE U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES xv-xix (2012); Marshall, supra note 105, at 773. 
 140.  See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 
(2004) (defining “constitutional hardball” as political practices that are “within the 
bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and practice but that are nonetheless in some 
tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings. . . . [because its practitioners] 
believe the stakes of the political controversy their actions provoke are quite high, and 
that their defeat and their opponents’ victory would be a serious, perhaps permanent 
setback to the political positions they hold”). 
 141.  See Joshua Green, Strict Obstructionist, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/strict-obstructionist/ 
308344/.  
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For example, despite the ACA’s flaws, Republicans refused to work 
with the President to improve the law.142 Some of this disagreement was 
ideological, reflecting opposing visions of government’s proper role in 
society.143 Much of it, though, was simply partisan politics.144 Though most 
everybody agreed the ACA needed improvement, Congress refused even to 
consider additional legislation to try to minimize its glitches.145 Republicans 
in Congress preferred that the law operate as poorly as possible, even if 
many Americans would suffer in the meantime.146 After all, an improvement 
to the ACA might be a “win” for the President.147  
At the time, many Republicans justified their behavior on the 
ideological grounds that they opposed the ACA in its entirety.148 During the 
early weeks of the Trump Administration, however, many of these same 
politicians supported a bill that would have retained key ACA provisions, 
such as the protection of dependent care until age 26, the pre-existing-
conditions policy, the essential-health-benefits requirement, and the 
prohibitions on annual and lifetime limits.149 Admittedly, there were crucial 
points of genuine philosophical disagreement, but future events help 
demonstrate that many Republicans found some parts of the law acceptable.  
 
 142.  See Zoë Carpenter, A Blueprint for the GOP’s Attempt to Sabotage Obamacare, 
NATION (July 25, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/blueprint-gops-attempt-
sabotage-obamacare/. 
 143.  See id.  
 144.  See id.  
 145.  See Steven Waldman, The Obamacare Exchanges Are a Mess and It’s Not Really 
Obama’s Fault, FORTUNE (Oct. 4, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/04/ 
obamacare-exchanges/ (explaining that in the last six years, there were no major fixes to 
the ACA); Jeffrey Young, Congress Could Easily Fix a Huge Obamacare Problem. It 
Won’t, HUFFPOST (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/05/ 
obamacare-lawsuits_n_5648871.html. 
 146. Waldman, supra note 145 (arguing that Republicans intentionally decided to 
make Americans suffer to try to damage President Obama politically).  
 147.  Admittedly, given sharp ideological disagreements, it would have been difficult 
for Democrats and Republicans to agree on substantial revisions to the ACA. That said, 
Republicans refused even to negotiate over revisions, deciding that they wanted 
Americans to suffer from the law’s flaws so that they could blame Democrats rather than 
make improvements that could potentially increase the ACA’s popularity. See id. 
 148.  See id. 
 149.  See Haeyoun Park & Margot Sanger-Katz, The Parts of Obamacare 
Republicans Will Keep, Change or Discard, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com 
/interactive/2017/03/06/us/politics/republican-obamacare-replacement.html. 
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Republicans’ refusal to work with the President was hardly limited to 
health care. Congress similarly refused to address other problems facing the 
nation, neglecting even routine obligations such as passing a budget and 
raising the debt ceiling.150 Whereas Republicans during the Obama years 
professed to be appalled at the level of governmental debt, some of those 
same politicians seemed more willing to raise the debt ceiling and avoid 
defaulting on the country’s debts once their own party regained the White 
House in 2017.151  
The Republicans’ bad faith was also evident in the field of foreign 
affairs. For example, when President Obama requested congressional 
authorization to respond with force to President Assad’s chemical weapons 
attack in Syria, most Republicans opposed such permission.152 Prominent 
congressional Republicans such as Mitch McConnell, Marco Rubio, Paul 
Ryan, and Mac Thornberry all opposed President Obama’s plan to respond 
with force.153 All four reversed course and supported President Trump’s 
decision to use unilateral military force responding to Assad’s chemical 
attack a few years later.154 To be fair, some Republicans such as Rand Paul 
opposed intervention in both instances, and others, such as John McCain and 
Lindsey Graham, contended on both occasions that military strikes should 
be part of a broader overall strategy.155 But many Republicans 
opportunistically and hypocritically opposed President Obama at every turn, 
seemingly without consideration of the merits of the issue. 
 
 150.  See Jonathan Weisman, House G.O.P. Raises Stakes in Debt-Ceiling Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/us/politics/house-gop-
leaders-list-conditions-for-raising-debt-ceiling.html; Jonathan Weisman & Jeremy W. 
Peters, Government Shuts Down in Budget Impasse, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/us/politics/congress-shutdown-debate.html. 
 151.  See, e.g., Bess Levin, Surprise: Republicans No Longer Care About the Debt 
Ceiling, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/ 
03/surprise-republicans-no-longer-care-about-the-debt-ceiling; Damian Paletta, 
McConnell Says There Is ‘Zero Chance’ Congress Will Fail to Raise Debt Ceiling, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/ 
08/21/mcconnell-says-zero-chance-congress-will-fail-to-raise-debt-ceiling/?utm_term 
=.3a177d2ed017. 
 152.  See Alicia Parlapiano, Where Top Lawmakers Stand on Syria: Now and in 2013, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/ 
04/07/us/politics/congress-quotes-on-syria-airstrikes.html. 
 153.  See id. 
 154.  See id.  
 155.  See id. 
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D. Legal and General Legacies 
 I concede that some informed observers might view these events 
differently. For the purposes of this symposium contribution, my primary 
concern is not where to place the moral and political blame (though I 
obviously have my views), but the various factors that help shape a 
president’s legacy. The example of Lincoln suggests that constitutional 
violations shape a president’s legacy less than some lawyers might care to 
think.156 President Lincoln, to be sure, confronted not just political 
dysfunction but civil war, so we should be careful not to generalize too much 
from his example. But other presidents also have committed constitutional 
violations without much apparent damage to their historical reputations. 
President Thomas Jefferson, for instance, completed the Louisiana 
Purchase, and his presidency is generally well regarded, though he himself 
believed the transaction to be unconstitutional.157 The Supreme Court 
invalidated President Harry Truman’s seizure of the steel mills,158 but 
Truman ranks highly on many historians’ lists.159 Depending on the context, 
we are sometimes willing to forgive constitutional transgressions, even when 
judges, rather than pundits, have pronounced the deeds unconstitutional.160  
Different critics will characterize the actions of President Obama and 
his Republican adversaries differently, and it is well beyond the scope of this 
symposium contribution to attempt a definitive account of the era’s political 
skirmishes. For the sake of argument, though, let’s hypothesize that many 
congressional Republicans during the Obama years played constitutional 
hardball with particularly unscrupulous bad faith.161 How should this 
assessment of congressional motives affect our view of President Obama’s 
constitutional legacy?  
Congress’s bad faith does not alter the legalist analysis. For better or 
worse, a central principle of our Constitution is that it should be difficult for 
government to act, so congressional obstruction does not license the 
 
 156.  See supra Part II.  
 157.  See Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional?, supra note 
47, at 1149–50; see Presidential Historians Survey 2017, supra note 44. 
 158.  See Youngstown Sheet & Tubing Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952).  
 159.  See Presidential Historians Survey 2017, supra note 44.  
 160.   See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589. 
 161.  See Marshall, supra note 105, at 773 (noting that President Obama faced “one 
of the most obstructionist Congresses in American history”); Tushnet, supra note 140, at 
523. 
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President to act instead.162  Judges reviewing military or (more likely) 
administrative actions usually do not consider whether Congress is playing 
nice. 
 These legal lines matter less to historians, who enjoy the luxury of 
considering events through multiple lenses. With this in mind, I suspect 
historians writing this period won’t dwell too long on the constitutionality of 
Obama’s actions. To be sure, President Obama made some constitutionally 
questionable decisions.163 His drone strike program, in particular, was 
troubling, because the Administration was less than fully transparent about 
the criteria it used to target the lives of specific individuals.164  
For the most part, though, President Obama’s constitutional actions 
were well within the range established by his predecessors. Perhaps 
particular administrative actions were illegal on statutory or administrative 
grounds, but, as noted above, President Obama’s reliance on the 
administrative state was hardly unusual.165  Similarly, Obama’s willingness to 
use military force without congressional authorization fits within 
established, albeit controversial, precedents, and they addressed a fast-
 
 162.  See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 29 (2006) 
[hereinafter LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION] (“[M]ore than one 
representative and senator has accompanied retirement from Congress with comments 
about their own frustration at the difficulty of actually getting anything done . . . .”). 
Whether this constitutional feature serves our country well is an entirely different 
question. See id. at 29–32 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of bicameralism). 
 163.  See supra Part III.  
 164.  See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION AGAINST 
A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN 
ASSOCIATED FORCE, http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_ 
White_Paper.pdf (“[T]he threat posed by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces demands a 
broader concept of imminence.”); Spencer Ackerman, Obama Claims US Drone Strikes 
Have Killed Up to 116 Civilians, GUARDIAN (July 1, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/01/obama-drones-strikes-civilian-deaths 
(quoting Humans Rights First as saying that the information released did not provide 
enough data); Deborah Pearlstein, Re-Engaging on an ISIL AUMF, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 
22, 2016),  http://opiniojuris.org/2016/09/22/re-engaging-on-an-isil-aumf/ (“[T]he secrecy 
surrounding U.S. drone operations for most of the Administration contributed to the 
problem, making it almost impossible for the people to perform any meaningful check 
on executive uses of force abroad . . . .”); The Editorial Board, Transparency in the Drone 
Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/ 
20/opinion/sunday/transparency-in-the-drone-wars.html (stating what information 
should have been given for transparency). 
 165.  See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.  
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changing terrorist threat.166  Even the drone strike program, though relying 
on new technology, is arguably not dramatically different from past covert 
military actions.167  
Phrased somewhat differently, while President Obama certainly used 
his office aggressively, he followed a well-tread path.  As Professor 
Skowronek has put it, the Presidency is an office “that regularly reaches 
beyond itself to assert control over others, . . . one whose normal activities 
and operations alter system boundaries and recast political possibilities.”168 
The Obama presidency was surely consequential from a variety of 
perspectives, but Obama’s use of the powers vested in his office was mostly 
unremarkable. Of course, reasonable people can lament the vast powers that 
accrue to the president in our constitutional system, but that is a question 
that transcends any particular president’s legacy.169  
From that perspective, President Obama’s legacy does not have strong 
constitutional implications. More or less, he stayed the course established by 
his predecessors. Not all presidencies are constitutionally transformative. As 
Professor Whittington argues, “Few presidents have the desire or authority 
to challenge inherited constitutional and ideological norms and attempt to 
construct a new political regime. Far more common are affiliated leaders, 
who rise to power within an assumed framework of goals, possibilities, and 
resources.”170 
Moreover, even if we accept that some of President Obama’s actions 
exceeded constitutional boundaries, it is far from clear that that legal story 
would bury his legacy more generally.171 To the contrary, the historian would 
likely note the President’s accomplishments despite difficult challenges and 
 
 166.  See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 167.  For example, efforts to try to assassinate foreign leaders or to overthrow foreign 
governments are arguably roughly analogous. See, e.g., Daniel L. Byman, Why Drones 
Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice, BROOKINGS (June 17, 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-for-washingtons-
weapon-of-choice/. The argument is not that these actions are legally (or morally) 
unproblematic, but rather that President Obama does not appear to have ventured into 
radically new constitutional territory. See id. Moreover, to the extent that precise drone 
strikes, at least in theory, can kill dangerous terrorists with minimal damage to innocent 
civilians and U.S. troops, there are serious policy arguments in their favor.   
 168.   SKOWRONEK, supra note 43, at 4. 
 169.   See infra Part V. 
 170.   WHITTINGTON, supra note 5, at 23. 
 171.  See supra text accompanying notes 56–77. 
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a bitter opposition that wasn’t willing to work with him on anything. To this 
extent, the lead story from 2010 to 2016 may be Congress’s profound 
intransigence rather than the Administration’s reliance on administrative 
agencies.172 Similarly, while history may judge some of Obama’s military 
interventions less kindly, in this sphere, too, it must recognize that Congress 
took no constructive steps to address serious situations.  
My objective here is not to be an apologist for President Obama, whose 
legacy does include some unfortunate blemishes.173 Rather, it is to point out 
that the court of history often eschews legal analysis, especially when there 
are plausible legal arguments on either side. However historians come down 
on Obama’s constitutional legacy, they will write the era differently than 
lawyers would.  
IV. ENTER PRESIDENT TRUMP 
The x factor for President Obama’s legacy—and for the future of our 
country—is his successor, President Trump. How will the Trump White 
House’s own constitutional legacy color historians’ views of President 
Obama? Presidents are remembered in part by whom they succeeded and 
 
 172.  See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.  
 173.  For example, President Obama insisted that the Assad regime would cross a 
“red line” if it used chemical weapons and then failed to act when Assad crossed that 
line. Greg Jaffe, The Problem with Obama’s Account of the Syrian Red-Line Incident, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2016/10/4/the-problem-with-obamas-account-of-the-Syrian-red-line-
incident/?utm_term=.7702141c3602. But see Derek Chollet, Obama’s Red Line, 
Revisited, POLITICO MAG. (July 19, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016 
/07/obama-syria-foreign-policy-red-line-revisited-214059 (arguing that Obama’s 
handling of this situation “accomplished everything it set out to do”). Obama himself 
acknowledged mistakes in his handling of the Libya situation. See Dominic Tierney, The 
Legacy of Obama’s ‘Worst Mistake’, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/obamas-worst-mistake-libya/ 
478461/. Even fans of the ACA would acknowledge that the initial rollout of the 
exchanges was haphazard and unprofessional. See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Rough Obamacare 
Rollout: 4 Reasons Why, CNN (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/22/ 
politics/obamacare-website-four-reasons/index.html. President Obama also did not take 
meaningful steps to address the role of money in politics (though admittedly judicial 
precedent limited his options here). See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST? 191–
92, 280–81 (2012). Finally, President Obama’s aggressive crackdown on national security 
whistleblowers and leakers likely harmed both governmental transparency and free 
speech norms. See Eyal Press, Obama Leaves Trump a Mixed Legacy on Whistle-
Blowers, NEW YORKER (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
news/daily-comment/obama-leaves-trump-a-mixed-legacy-on-whistle-blowers.  
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preceded. Lincoln’s legacy, for instance, is likely enhanced in part by 
Andrew Johnson’s disastrous presidency and the vague sense that 
Reconstruction might have turned out differently somehow had Lincoln 
presided over it.174 There is, no doubt, a loony sort of hindsight bias to this; 
Lincoln (obviously) was dead when Johnson was President, so it seems odd 
to judge him by events and decisions over which he had no control. But we 
make sense of events and public figures by comparing them to other things 
we know, and historians glean insights by comparing presidents within the 
same era.175  
 Only half a year into the Trump Administration, it is too early to make 
any definitive assessments, but the early months suggest he does not take the 
rule of law seriously. President Trump’s decision to fire FBI Director James 
Comey, who was investigating possible collusion between the Trump 
presidential campaign and Russia, appears to be an obstruction of justice 
reflecting disregard for the rule of law and important governmental 
institutions.176 Even if Trump himself did not collude with the Kremlin, his 
action interfering with an ongoing investigation eliminated vital institutional 
checks within the Executive Branch.177 Similarly, President Trump’s refusal 
to divest his assets to mitigate potential conflicts of interest indicates that he 
will put his personal interests above legal norms.178 Indeed, Trump’s 
apparent willingness to accept benefits from foreign governments, such as 
payments from governments whose officials stay in his hotels, creates an 
avoidable Emoluments Clause issue.179  
More generally, President Trump seems utterly ignorant of and 
indifferent to the law. The President’s open disdain of judges who rule 
 
 174.  See FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 25, at 184. 
 175.   See SKOWRONEK, supra note 43, at 8 (“Certainly it is no accident that the 
presidents most widely celebrated for their mastery of American politics have been 
immediately preceded by presidents generally judged politically incompetent.”). 
 176. See David Cole, Trump’s Constitutional Crisis, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10, 
2017), www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/05/10/trumps-constitutional-crisis-James-Comey. 
 177.  See id.  
 178.  See Elizabeth Drew, Trump: The Presidency in Peril, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 
22, 2017), www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/06/22/trump-presidency-in-peril. 
 179.  See Norman L. Eisen et al., The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and 
Application to Donald J. Trump 16, 18–21, GOVERNANCE STUDIES BROOKINGS (DEC. 
16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_ 
emoluments-clause1.pdf. Admittedly, there is no precedent fleshing out the Emoluments 
Clause, but there are certainly colorable arguments that President Trump is violating the 
Clause. See id.  
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against him suggests he sees constitutional conflict not as an opportunity to 
articulate a constitutional vision, but as a political stage on which to flex his 
muscles and denigrate anyone who stands in his way.180 It is not simply that 
Trump does not know much about the Constitution; it is that he seems proud 
of his ignorance and uninterested in the constitutional rules and standards 
that define his own power.181 Time will shed more light on whether Trump is 
truly lawless or merely obnoxious, but the early months of his 
Administration suggest a man whose knowledge of and respect for the 
Constitution are remarkably low for a U.S. president. 
Will President Obama seem constitutionally scrupulous by 
comparison, or, as Professor Somin argues, should he be blamed for 
transgressions that left President Trump with a “loaded gun?”182 It is too 
early to answer this question definitively, but I find the “loaded gun” theory 
overblown. For one, most of the constitutional questions arising so far during 
the Trump presidency largely have nothing to do with President Obama’s 
example. Furthermore, even if President Trump were to follow Obama’s 
aggressive use of the administrative state, for instance, the reliance on 
administrative agencies is hardly a phenomenon tied to one predecessor. 
Presidents had progressively augmented the Executive’s authority long 
before Obama took office.183 President Obama may have contributed to this 
phenomenon, but the office he took over was already a very powerful one.184 
If Trump found a loaded gun in the Oval Office, it was a gift from decades 
of predecessors, not just one.185 
Additionally, even if President Obama sometimes exceeded 
constitutional limits, he never lost sight of the Constitution. When the 
 
 180.  See Kristine Phillips, All the Times Trump Personally Attacked Judges—and 
Why His Tirades Are ‘Worse than Wrong’, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2017), 
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 181.   See Sanford Levinson & Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-
Publian Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 
CHAPMAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 7), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
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 182.  Somin, supra note 109. 
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Obama Administration took controversial constitutional actions, it sought 
to justify them with the language of the law.186 The legal arguments may 
sometimes have been unconvincing (especially to political opponents), but 
the Administration offered serious constitutional explanations for its 
actions.187  
The contrast with the Trump Administration is stark. If President 
Trump does not disdain the law, he certainly gives the appearance of doing 
so. Obama was no Lincoln, but Trump may well be another Nixon—that is, 
a president determined to abuse his office to enhance his own power and 
insulate himself from legal consequences. This is, after all, a man reportedly 
looking into using the pardon power to pardon not only his family members, 
but also himself.188 It is still early in his Administration, and, perhaps in 
hindsight, President Trump will not look so bad. So far, however, Trump 
seems to view the law as a political weapon or a pesky technicality.189 
President Obama, by comparison, was constitutionally devout.  
V. CONSIDERING CONSTITUTIONAL DYSFUNCTION 
The more important question may be not how history will judge 
President Obama after the Trump years, but how it will judge the 
Constitution. It is no secret that the country and Congress are bitterly 
divided along party lines.190 These deep divisions make it very difficult for 
Congress to act, leaving most policymaking in the hands of the executive 
branch.191  
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If your party controls the White House, this may not seem like such a 
bad thing, but this arrangement deprives the country of democratic 
deliberation about many important policy issues. It also results in policies 
more easily changed by future administrations, as new regulations can 
supplant old ones, generally without congressional input. Of course, 
administrative procedures like notice-and-comment rulemaking are arduous 
and time-consuming,192 but, at least in theory, each new administration can 
roll back the previous administration’s accomplishments without engaging 
democratically elected legislators.193 The result is not coherent, long-term 
policy, but rather a series of policy reversals as the presidency flips between 
political parties. 
The Constitution does not explicitly confer this policymaking power on 
the President, but in practice, all the checks and balances that make it 
difficult for Congress to act funnel such discretion to the President.194 This 
phenomenon should force us all to ask whether our Constitution is 
functioning well. The Framers wanted to foster deliberation and check 
legislative excess,195 but instead legislators frequently abdicate their 
policymaking responsibilities altogether. Presidents, thus, enjoy great de 
jure power and even greater de facto power.196 To the extent many find this 
phenomenon troubling,197 we should admit it is a problem that far transcends 
any one president.198   
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This acknowledgement need not imply the illegitimacy of the 
administrative state writ large. I, for one, generally support the legitimacy of 
administrative agencies, but nevertheless consider it problematic when most 
federal policymaking happens outside Congress.199 Regardless of our 
political views, we should all ask if the Constitution is working properly 
when Congress is so impotent.  
The Obama years also raise other questions about the Constitution. If 
historians ultimately do not judge President Obama’s constitutional 
transgressions too harshly, what would that assessment tell us about our 
nation’s fundamental law? The fact that Presidents Jefferson, Lincoln, and 
Truman (and others), despite apparent constitutional violations, rate highly 
suggests that constitutional law sometimes, perhaps even usually, gives way 
to political reality. Given these examples, why should we care about the 
legalist analysis—at least where we don’t have an actual case pending in 
court?200  
One answer might be that law does matter, but only when its 
requirements are clear. On this view, because the Constitution is under-
determinate, presidents have substantial leeway to push the Constitution’s 
boundaries so long as they do not clearly violate it.201 Some of President 
Obama’s actions were constitutionally questionable, but plausible legal 
arguments could still be made in their favor. Similarly, President Lincoln was 
able to offer plausible, if contestable, constitutional justifications for most of 
his actions.202 This may suggest that the historical and legalist legacies are 
interconnected. Were a president to violate the Constitution blatantly, the 
historian (like the judge) will so rule. But where the president’s actions are 
within the range of plausibility, the historian will more likely turn to 
nonlegalist factors.  
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There may be some truth to this hypothesis, but there is also more to 
it. Society mostly evaluates presidents’ legacies by nonlegalist criteria.203 We 
condemn Nixon and praise Lincoln not because Lincoln’s constitutional 
transgressions were “closer” legal questions, but because we consider 
Nixon’s goals corrupt and Lincoln’s righteous.204 Put differently, most people 
care more about normative concerns than legalist analysis.  
Norms, after all, are the foundation for public support. Nixon’s 
corruption lost him public support, including from his own party.205 When 
his public support evaporated, Nixon’s legal violations suddenly mattered a 
great deal.206 By contrast, though Lincoln and Obama both went through 
periods of unpopularity, both maintained enough public support to protect 
them enough from widespread charges of illegality. On this account, popular 
opinion matters more than formal legal analysis, at least for presidents.  
It also matters which constitutional provisions and values are in play. 
Constitutional provisions are not all created equal, at least not in the public’s 
eye. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that President Obama had 
improperly made recess appointments to the National Labor Relations 
Board,207 but outside the legal community, it is unlikely this decision will 
much affect the Obama legacy. The issue simply lacks the political or moral 
salience to play a large role in shaping society’s broader assessment of the 
Obama presidency,208 especially given that Obama merely followed the 
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example of past presidents.209  To be sure, the recess-appointments issue is 
connected to the broader, crucial issue of executive power, and legal scholars 
could fairly claim that President Obama ought not to have expanded the 
presidency’s already vast powers.210 For many members of the public, 
however, seemingly technical questions involving little known constitutional 
provisions like the Recess Appointments Clause likely lack the political 
salience to count much towards the President’s legacy one way or another.   
If there are truths in these hypotheses, we should ask whether society 
cares less about the Constitution writ large than it professes. Americans 
purport to revere the Constitution as our nation’s civic religion,211 but they 
often disagree about what it means and discount evidence militating against 
their preferred view.212 At the end of the day, people value their own beliefs 
more than abstract constitutional principles.213 We give Lincoln a 
constitutional pass because we admire his values and accomplishments. 
Notwithstanding our sworn fealty to the higher cause of the Constitution, we 
often insist that our civic religion must fit our values rather than the other 
way around.214  
Perhaps these attitudes, however suppressed, reflect a constitutional 
vision that is surprisingly closer to the British constitution, which embodies 
the accumulated wisdom acquired through generations of government.215 As 
Professor James Randall once explained, the U.S. Constitution, like the 
British, “is a matter of growth, development, and interpretation.”216 
Originalists may contest this characterization as a normative matter, but, as 
a descriptive one, it is hard to dispute that the nation has molded the 
Constitution to fit its needs through different eras.217 To this extent, our 
attitudes towards past presidents’ constitutional missteps may reflect an 
unstated recognition that constitutional norms change, that some of those 
 
 209.   See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560 (“Presidents have made recess appointments 
since the beginning of the Republic.”). 
 210.   See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 105, at 792. 
 211.  See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 10–11, 17 (1988).  
 212.  See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 67, at 729. 
 213.  See RANDALL, supra note 11, at 2 (“Laws and constitutions have importance 
not in themselves, but because of the social purposes which they embody.”).  
 214.  See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 67, at 726. 
 215.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 216.  RANDALL, supra note 11, at 5.  
 217.  See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS  
(1998); RANDALL, supra note 11, at 5.  
  
2017] Of Law and Legacies  987 
 
norms are more important than others, and that there are higher presidential 
virtues than constitutional adherence.218  
In more recent years, we should also ask whether we care less about 
legalist analysis because we recognize that the Constitution is not working 
as well as we like to think it is. This attitude may be implicit in our national 
discourse, but it is rarely explicit.219 To be sure, some scholars, most notably 
Professor Sandy Levinson, have emphasized the Constitution’s serious 
defects.220 Levinson, in fact, has called for a new constitutional convention.221 
The mainstream public, however, still says it loves its Constitution.222  
If we dig a little deeper, however, we find an unstated, yet palpable 
discomfort with the Constitution. Most Americans today agree that 
contemporary politics, certainly at the national stage, are dysfunctional.223 
Calls for a constitutional convention are growing more frequent and not just 
within the professoriate.224 While some (mostly conservative) critics claim 
they merely want to restore the document’s true meaning,225 the implicit 
acknowledgement is that today’s constitutional framework is not serving us 
well.  
The political dysfunction underlying those calls to reform was 
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especially acute during the Obama years,226 and whether or not a new 
convention is the proper remedy, the Constitution deserves some of the 
blame.227 Our system not only makes it very hard to pass legislation, but it 
also encourages extremism.228 Various interrelated phenomena such as 
partisan gerrymandering, political primaries, and winner-take-all voting 
districts have pushed House representatives to either end of the political 
spectrum.229  
Of these phenomena, gerrymandering is probably the most 
objectionable as it effectively allows representatives to select their electors, 
rather than the other way around.230 The Constitution alone does not create 
this phenomenon, but it tolerates it.231 As a result, new district lines protect 
incumbents, and Representatives can speak to their bases without worrying 
about other portions of the electorate.232 Indeed, many Representatives are 
at far greater risk of losing in a primary to a fellow party member pandering 
to the base, rather than in the general election to an opponent from the other 
party.233 Given this environment, most House members have little incentive 
to cooperate across the aisle, thus further contributing to ideological 
extremism.234  
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The Constitution erects a different kind of districting in the Senate.235 
As a result, Senator Mitch McConnell could brazenly admit that his political 
goal was to ruin the Obama presidency and know that it would probably help 
him in Kentucky.236 Likewise, Senate Republicans could refuse even to grant 
a hearing to Chief Judge Merrick Garland, an eminently qualified and fair-
minded Supreme Court nominee, and find that their tactic worked.237 By 
giving disproportionate political power to smaller states, the Constitution 
creates further potential for democratic minorities to thwart the will of the 
majority.238 Along similar lines, the Electoral College disproportionately 
weighs smaller states so that Donald Trump could win the 2016 election 
despite losing the popular vote by about 3 million votes.239  
Critics of the contemporary Republican Party must accept that our 
electoral structures in 2016 richly rewarded the Republicans’ behavior. 
Indeed, what appears to be “bad faith hardball” to some is shrewd political 
strategy to others.240 The Republicans’ vitriolic opposition to President 
Obama seemed beyond the pale to many observers.241 However, just as 
constitutional structures encouraged and permitted Republicans to obstruct 
Obama’s agenda, so too did they help the GOP claim victory in 2016. Of 
course numerous factors contributed to these outcomes, but constitutional 
structures were among them.  
How then do we assess the success of a Constitution that rewards 
politicians who relentlessly seek to sabotage their opponents? Similarly, how 
do we assess a political system that pushes most major policy decisions into 
a complex web of administrative bureaucracy far beyond the attention and 
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understanding of most ordinary citizens?242 And how do we assess a 
constitutional system in which presidents can repeatedly take unilateral 
military action without any meaningful check?243 
One common answer has been that we must endure the Constitution’s 
inefficiencies to stave off authoritarianism. But legislative inefficiency and 
gridlock have worsened, and the executive branch’s power has grown.244 
Now we have a President whom many fear has authoritarian impulses.245 
Perhaps these fears are overblown, but, if they are not, this is where the 
Constitution must prove its worth. We may tolerate governmental 
dysfunction if we know that it is the price we pay to keep despotism in check. 
In reality, though, by funneling so much power to the Executive Branch, the 
Constitution might enable, rather than prevent, despotism. What if the 
Constitution creates dysfunction and fails to check authoritarianism?  
This question is hardly academic. The traditional view is that public 
institutions and popular opinion check presidential ambitions.246 Trump has 
already demonstrated his disdain for institutions, for instance, by firing an 
FBI Director conducting an investigation the President deemed 
threatening.247 Perhaps other public institutions can check the President, but 
as this piece goes to press, it is unclear whether or how they will.  
It’s also unclear whether popular opinion today offers a meaningful 
check. Though Trump’s approval ratings are historically low for a new 
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president,248 he can claim that he won the election (albeit not the popular 
vote) and therefore enjoys a popular mandate to carry out his agenda. While 
opposition to Trump is high, there remains a significant segment of the 
population that approves of him or at least strongly prefers him to any 
alternative from the Democratic Party. This segment of the population will 
likely give President Trump a long leash, and the President knows it. 
Similarly, while Trump’s behavior clearly makes congressional Republicans 
nervous, for at least the time being, they know they must stay on good terms 
with him to advance their own legislative goals. Perhaps Trump will someday 
cross some line to alienate fellow Republicans, but opponents should not 
hold their breath. After all, most Republicans have stuck with Trump so far.   
These are good reasons for pessimism, but it is important to remember 
that just because the Constitution has contributed to these problems does 
not mean that it is a failure. Our institutions have not functioned well in 
recent years, but the Constitution’s shortcomings are only one reason. 
Contemporary cultural phenomena—such as intensely fought culture wars, 
surging populism, a viciously partisan media, easily exploited social media, 
uninformed voters, and voter clumping—play substantial roles as well.249  
Before turning to a new constitutional convention, we would also be 
wise to remember that it has endured for well over two centuries, and the 
nation, for all its problems, has prospered. Admittedly, the Constitution 
bears substantial blame for the Civil War that almost destroyed the Union, 
but the fact remains that our constitutional democracy has been more stable 
for longer than most.  To the extent we still have some meaningful checks on 
governmental power, they exist in large part because Americans accept the 
legitimacy of the Constitution that imposes those limitations. Any new 
system would have to earn that presumptive respect, and the early years 
would be uncertain. Furthermore, it is not clear that alternative structures 
are better; all governmental systems contain their own problematic 
pathologies.250  
Perhaps most importantly, in our poisoned political climate we would 
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have a very difficult time agreeing on something better. Article V provides 
no guidance about the ground rules for a constitutional convention, so 
political parties and figures would each try to use the process to game the 
system in their favor.  Such political wrangling would be more likely to 
further inflame partisan animosities than to produce thoughtful 
improvements to the Constitution.  
Indeed, given that a constitutional convention would have high stakes 
and no clear initial procedural rules, the “losers” of such a gathering may 
well seek to deepen the nation’s discord. One highly educated friend of mine 
told me that he would “take up arms” if a new constitutional convention 
agreed to abandon equal representation in the Senate. There are, of course, 
serious arguments both for and against the Senate as currently constituted. 
The evident rage this and other constitutional issues can provoke, however, 
should caution us against a convention that could add even more fuel to the 
nation’s already-partisan fires.     
Nevertheless, while a constitutional convention today would be a bad 
idea, we do need to have a serious national conversation about our 
Constitution and failing political system. Instead of mindlessly declaring 
their devotion to the Constitution, Americans should have candid 
discussions about how it serves us well and how it fails us. Instead of 
conveniently blaming political opponents for all our ills, Americans should 
ask how institutional structures and incentives contribute to the problem—
and what citizens and various public actors can do to improve things, short 
of scrapping the Constitution altogether.251  
The Obama and Trump Administrations share little in common, but 
both should force us to ask these questions. Indeed, if there is a lasting 
constitutional legacy from the Obama presidency, perhaps it should be 
newfound attention to the Constitution’s shortcomings. These are not the 
Republic’s finest days, but if we can use today’s difficulties to address such 
fundamental issues, some good might come out of them yet.   
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